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Abstract
The purpose of this work is to design,
assemble and program the access control
system in embedded conception for
controlling access into house, room or
hall. Further this work focuses on the
security of the designed system. In the
theoretical part is described how these
systems works nowodays, introduction to
RFID technology, RFID components and
development boards, which is used as a
central unit for the designed system.
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Abstrakt
Účelem této práce je navrhnout, sestavit
v koncepci embedded a naprogramovat
systém pro řízení přístupu do domu,
místnosti či objektu s použitím RFID
technologie. Dále se tato práce zaměřuje
na bezpečnost navrženého systemu. V
teoreticke části je popsáno, jak v dnešní
době tyto systémy fungují, úvod do RFID
technologie, součásti RFID technologie
a vývojové kity, které pro tento návrh
systému slouží jako centrální jednotka.
Klíčová slova: Arduino, čtečka, karta,
RFID, tag, transponder
Překlad názvu: Přístupový systém
iii
Contents
0.1 List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 Introduction 2
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Why electronic door lock? . . . . . . 2
1.3 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Part I
Theoretical part
2 Access control systems 6
2.1 Electromagnetic door lock . . . . . . 6
2.2 Access control systems . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1 Online Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.2 Oﬄine Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 Contactless smart cards and
proximity cards 8
3.1 Introduction to RFID . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 Introduction to NFC . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3 Contactless smart cards and
proximity cards - General . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3.1 RF interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3.2 Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4 HID Prox Card II . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5 Mifare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.6 Types of mifare cards . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6.1 Mifare Classic . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.6.2 Mifare Desﬁre . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.7 Mifare Classic hack . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.7.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.8 How the cryptography was
revealed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.8.1 Weakness of Crypto1
algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4 RFID readers 18
4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2 Reader interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.1 Wiegand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.2 SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.3 I2C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
iv
4.2.4 Serial UART . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 HID Prox Point Plus . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4 NXP MFRC522 reader . . . . . . . . 23
4.5 ACS ACR122U reader . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Microcontroller development
boards 25
5.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2 Arduino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.1 Arduino IDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.2 Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3 Arduino UNO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.4 Digispark USB development
board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Part II
Practical part
6 Design of the access control
system 31
6.1 Part list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2 Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.3 Program description . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3.1 Card authentication . . . . . . . . 34
6.3.2 Editing the system . . . . . . . . . 36
6.3.3 Multiple card adding . . . . . . . 38
7 Design of the access control
system - reduced and smaller
solution 39
7.1 Part list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.2 Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.3 Program description . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.3.1 First turned on . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.3.2 Card authentication . . . . . . . . 43
7.3.3 User card list editing . . . . . . . 44
7.3.4 Admin card list editing . . . . . 45
8 Hacking the electronic door lock
system 47
8.1 Possibilities of hacking access
control systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.2 Mifare Classic hack
documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.2.1 Attempt of hack a strange
Mifare Classic card . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
v
8.3 Security of the HID RFID
technology used in the second system
design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.4 Conclussions of the card cloning 51
8.5 Other options of hacking the
designed systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9 Conclusions 53
Bibliography 57
Appendices
A Photo documentation of the
created access control systems 64
B Video documentation of the
created access control systems 66
vi
Figures
3.1 Sample structure of a card
ISO/IEC 14443 [5] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Sample of a card block diagram
[2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3 Prox Card II 26-bit format data
structure [7] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4 Mifare Classic memory
organization [5] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5 Crypto-1 stream cipher [13] . . . . 14
3.6 Picture of the transistor layer [13] 17
4.1 Diagram of master-slave
communication between application,
reader and transponder [2] . . . . . . . 18
4.2 Wiegand signal [19] . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3 SPI diagram [20] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4 I2C diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.5 Simpliﬁed UART interface [26] . 22
4.6 Photo of ProxPoint Plus reader
[28] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.7 MFRC522 reader block diagram
[22] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.8 ACR122U reader [30] . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1 Digispark USB development board
[38] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1 Access control system block
diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2 Button circuit connection . . . . . . 33
6.3 Flowchart of the card
authentication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.4 The system editing ﬂowchart. . . 36
6.5 The multiple card adding
ﬂowchart. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.1 Access control system - smaller
solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.2 This ﬂowchart runs when the
system is ﬁrst time turned on, so it
has clean EEPROM. . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.3 This ﬂowchart shows
authentication loop which runs when
the system is not in editing state and
any card is presented to the reader. 43
7.4 This ﬂowchart shows the user card
list editing loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.5 This ﬂowchart shows the admin
card list editing loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
vii
8.1 Mifare Classic Hack - terminal
output part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.2 Mifare Classic Hack - terminal
output part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.3 Mifare Classic Hack - terminal
output part 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.4 Mifare Classic Hack - terminal
output part 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.5 Sample ISIC card used for hack . 50
8.6 ISIC card hack - important part of
terminal output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.1 Photo of the ﬁnal working device -
Access control system . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.2 Photo of the ﬁnal working device -
Access control system, smaller and
reduced solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Tables
3.1 The mostly used RFID frequency
bands [4] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 ISO/IEC 14443 parts [2] . . . . . . . 12
4.1 Deﬁnition of signal lines used for
SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2 I2C transmission rates . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1 Pin abbreviations [31] . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2 Arduino UNO pins [31] . . . . . . . . 27
5.3 Digispark pins [39] . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1 Arduino UNO pin connection . . 32
7.1 Digispark pin connection . . . . . . 40
viii
...................................0.1. List of Abbreviations
0.1 List of Abbreviations
AID . . . . . . . . . . . Application Identifier
APDU . . . . . . . . . Application protocol data unit
API . . . . . . . . . . . . Application Programming Interface
ASK . . . . . . . . . . . Amplitude Shift key
CCC . . . . . . . . . . . Chaos Computer Club
EEPROM . . . . . Erasable programmable read-only memory
FRAM . . . . . . . . Ferroelectric Random Access Memory
FSK . . . . . . . . . . . Frequency Shift keying
GND . . . . . . . . . . Ground
I2C . . . . . . . . . . . . Inter-Integrated Circuit
IC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Integrated Circuit
IDE . . . . . . . . . . . . Integrated development environment
IEC . . . . . . . . . . . . International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO . . . . . . . . . . . . International Organization for Standardization
LCD . . . . . . . . . . . Liquid Crystal Display
LED . . . . . . . . . . . Light emitting diode
LFSR . . . . . . . . . . Linear feedback shift register
PCB . . . . . . . . . . . Printed circuit board
PICC . . . . . . . . . . Proximity Integrated Circuit Card
RAM . . . . . . . . . . Random access memory
RFID . . . . . . . . . . Radio-frequency identification
RNG . . . . . . . . . . Random number generator
ROM . . . . . . . . . . Read only memory
SDK . . . . . . . . . . . Software development kit
SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . Serial peripheral interface
SRAM . . . . . . . . . Static random-access memory
UART . . . . . . . . . Universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter
UID . . . . . . . . . . . Unique Identifier
USB . . . . . . . . . . . Universal Serial Bus
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter presents background, purpose and objectives to make clear
the goal of this thesis.
1.1 Background
RFID technology is happening to be very popular these days for various
applications such as industrial automation, access control, animal
identification, public transport, event ticketing, parking, electronic wallet,
goods identification and many more. The question is how secure this
technology is. The answer is, that there are various manufacturers providing
RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) devices with various security.
Information delivered by the manufacturers about the security should be
clear.
1.2 Why electronic door lock?
However, there are very secure door locks, commonly used mechanical door
lock has a lot of disadvantages. It’s easy to clone keys and it’s even possible
to open the door without the key. If a key is lost, changing the lock is needed,
which could be even impossible in some cases. Somebody who finds the lost
key would be able to open the door. Electronic door lock might came out with
solutions of these problems, however every lock is possible to hack somehow.
A key of electronic door lock is usually RFID tag or card, but it can be also
mobile phone communicating via bluetooth interface etc. The user’s card
may be also used in other applications, like electronic purse. In case that
user loses his card, the card can be deleted from the system. There is also so
many advantages like user info can be stored on the RFID card and part of
the system might be a server where scanned cards are monitored.
3
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1.3 Objectives
The purpose of this thesis is to design and assembly an RFID based access
control system composed of inexpensive RFID devices used today and examine
its security and possibility of hacking it. In the conclusions, it’s assessed if the
information given by the manufacturer gives a clear picture of the security of
his RFID technology.
4
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Part I
Theoretical part
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Chapter 2
Access control systems
This chapter includes an introduction to electromagnetic door locks and
access control systems.
2.1 Electromagnetic door lock
Electromagnetic door lock is the same like ordinary mechanical door lock,
but the iron bar blocking the door is controlled by a coil. Current flowing
through the coil creates an electromagnetic field, which acts on the bar by
force and also there is a spring with a force in the opposite direction than
the coil. If the coil is powered on, this force pulls the bar to the coil and the
door are released. In quiescent state the coil is powered off and the iron bar
is pulled into the door so it blocks the door [1].
2.2 Access control systems
Access control systems can be divided into two main groups: online and
oﬄine systems. However, it’s possible to combine these two variants [2].
2.2.1 Online Systems
Online access control systems have all the readers and door locks connected
to a central computer with a database whereby all the door locks and readers
are being controlled and monitored. The history of all the activities is usually
being stored in the central computer and all authorized cards are stored in
the central computer database, so all the changes like adding and removing a
card are easily done by editing the database. This is advantageous, because
when a card is lost, it’s removed from the database and protected area stays
safe. Informations about card’s user can be stored in the central computer
database, so the card only have to be able to store a small amount of data,
7
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like unique card identification number. Online systems are best suited for
access control systems where is many people to enter the building with only a
few entrances to the building, for example office buildings or universities [2].
2.2.2 Oﬄine Systems
Oﬄine access control systems have for each door one system which consists
of reader, central unit and door lock and these systems of all doors are not
interconnected. Each system have saved a list of all authorized cards in its
memory. If there are more rooms to access and one card shall provide access
only to some of them, information regarding the rooms to which the card
can provide access can be stored on the card. Other option is to have every
system with different list of authorized cards stored in the memory of the
system’s central unit.
Buildings with many rooms like hotels use one system for every room with a
few card numbers stored in its memory. Receptionist gives a card to guest,
which is authorized only for particular room. When authorized card is lost,
the card number needs to be deleted from all certain systems with use of a
suitable programming device. Oﬄine systems are best suited for the cases
where is many individual rooms to access and only a few people have access
to these rooms [2].
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Chapter 3
Contactless smart cards and proximity
cards
This chapter includes introduction to the RFID and NFC technology with
whom we are going to deal with. Further this chapter describes fundamentals,
communication protocols, data structures, security and usage of contactless
smart cards and proximity cards.
3.1 Introduction to RFID
RFID is a technology using electromagnetic field to identify objects. The
identification can be done only for a short distance from a few centimeters to
a hundreds of meters [3] [4]. RFID communication is always between two
sides, which is usually reader/writer device and an RFID tag or card (also
called transponder).
The RFID reader acts as a master and the card acts as a slave during the
RF communication, which means the reader sends commands to the tag and
the card sends answers back to the reader [3].
RFID tags can be divided into passive, semi-passive and active. Passive
tags have no power supply, semi-passive tags have a battery but used only for
powering its microchip and not to power the RF interface. Active tags have
power supply (usually battery) to power the microchip and the RF interface.
To establish the wireless communication between the passive or semi-passive
tag and reader, the reader must create powerful electromagnetic field in
order to power the tag through its own antenna. Passive tags are used only
at short ranges up to a few meters. Semi-passive tags don’t need such power
supplied by the reader, because the chip in the semi-passive tag is powered
externally, so it can be used on a longer distance around tens of meters. For
even greater reading distance, about hundreds of meters, are being used
active tags, but the reading distance depends on many other factors [2].
9
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"True physical tag maximum read distance is determined by the individual
RFID reader and antenna power, the actual Integrated Circuit used in the
RFID tag, the material and thickness of material the tag is coated or covered
with, the type of antenna the tag uses, the material the tag is attached to and
more!" [4]
In most of the cases are used passive tags, because it’s more comfortable
with no need of maintenance.
"Many RFID standards have been released by the industry. Most of them
have as operating frequency 125 KHz or 13.56 MHz." [3]
Table 3.1 shows the mostly used RFID bands.
RF band frequency
LF (low frequencies) 125 kHz and 134,3 kHz
HF (high frequencies) 13.56 MHz
UHF (ultra high frequencies) 860 MHz - 960 MHz and 433 MHz
SHF (super high frequencies) 2.45 GHz
Table 3.1: The mostly used RFID frequency bands [4]
3.2 Introduction to NFC
The NFC technology is a subset within RFID technology developed jointly
by companies NXP Semiconductors (at that time named Philips
semiconductors) and Sony in frequency range 13.56 MHz with maximum
communication range up to 20 cm. It’s called near-field communication,
because during the wireless communication antennas of receiver and
transmitter are in near-field.
The NFC interface is being mounted into electronic devices such as mobile
phones and it enables to these devices a card emulation, reader emulation
and peer-to-peer communication. So such NFC device can be used for
electronic payment instead of credit card[2].
"NFC is specified according to standards ISO/IEC 18092 NFCIP-1 (ECMA
340) and ISO/IEC 21481 NFCIP-2 (ECMA 352) (Philips Semiconductors,
2006)" [2]
NFC is also compatible with all ISO/IEC 14443 type A based smart cards
and readers such as NXP’s Mifare and Sony’s Felica smart cards [2].
3.3 Contactless smart cards and proximity cards -
General
RFID cards and tags for access control systems are passive and have various
construction formats, the most common are coin and card. Both shapes are
practical for users, coin for carrying on a keychain and card to carrying it
in a wallet. The transponder’s circuit is integrated in a very small chip and
antenna is outside of the chip. Figure 3.1 shows a typical physical structure
10
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of a card.
]
Figure 3.1: Sample structure of a card ISO/IEC 14443 [5]
It’s possible to say that RFID card or tag is a memory unit which can be
accessed without physical contact, because of the RF interface and micro-
controller or other logic which manages the communication and memory
access or cryptography [3] [6].
3.3.1 RF interface
The card’s RF interface consists of the antenna coil, and modulator circuit.
It has two following functions: transmit the data between reader and the
card and gain the power from the reader to power the integrated circuit [2].
"To achieve this, the RF interface draws current from the transponder antenna,
which is rectified and supplied to the chip as a regulated supply voltage." [2]
When the card is receiving data, the modulated RF signal sent by the reader
is represented in the RF interface and demodulator creates a digital serial
data stream of it. For the opposite direction when the card transmits data to
the reader, the data stream is modulated via modulator and sent via antenna
coil. Majority RFID interfaces uses ASK modulation such as ISO/IEC 14443,
but there are many other modulations used by various manufacturers [2].
3.3.2 Memory
The card’s memory is being accessed by the microcontroller or addresses
and security logic as shown in example of a card block diagram in figure 3.3
[2].
Figure 3.2: Sample of a card block diagram [2]
11
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The read-only transponders contain only ROM (Read-only memory), which
is programmed by manufacturer. Transponder with ability to write data on
it may have EEPROM (Erasable programmable read-only memory), RAM
(Random access memory) or FRAM (Ferroelectric RAM).
3.4 HID Prox Card II
The Prox Card II made by HID Global communicates at 125 kHz and it
is inductively-coupled passive proximity card compliant with ISO/IEC 7810.
For the communication with a reader it uses wiegand binary interface FSK
(Frequency Shift Keying) modulation and data on the card are stored in
wiegand format.
It has size of memory from 26 to 40 bits. In this project is used 26 bit format
with ordering code number H10301. Bits of the card can be divided into three
categories which is facility code, card number, and parity bits. The card
number should be unique for one system where it’s used. The facility code is
programmable and should be the same for one system, company or region. It
enables to use the same card number for different system companies or regions.
Parity bits are used for directly detecting errors during the communication.
Figure 3.3: Prox Card II 26-bit format data structure [7]
As shown in figure 3.3 the 26 bit array starts with even parity bit covering
facility code, then follows 8 bits of facility code, 16 bits of card code and
finally the odd parity bit covering the card number. So it has 255 options
of facility code and 65535 options of card number. The HID Global has no
limitations on use of this format, so if all the bits of the card (without parity
bits) are used as one card ID, there is 16 777 215 options of the card ID [8]
[7] [9].
3.5 Mifare
"MIFARE is NXP’s well-known brand for a wide range of contactless IC
products with a typical read/write distance of 10 cm (4 inch) used in more
than 40 different applications worldwide." [10]
Mifare cards appeared on the market in 1994 and more than 10 billions was
sold till now. The price of Mifare cards is low, because it’s very widespread.
Mifare cards belong to category PICC (Proximity Integrated Circuit Card)
12
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and there is a number of variants of mifare cards with different features.
Today the most frequently used are MIFARE Ultralight, MIFARE Classic,
MIFARE Plus, MIFARE DESFire and SmartMX [10] [11].
Mifare cards are fully compliant with international standard ISO/IEC 14443
type A which consists of four parts. Table 3.2 shows list of those parts.
ISO/IEC 14443-1 Physical characteristics
ISO/IEC 14443-2 Radio frequency power and signal interface
ISO/IEC 14443-3 Initialization and anti-collision
ISO/IEC 14443-4 Transmission protocols
Table 3.2: ISO/IEC 14443 parts [2]
There is also standard ISO/IEC 14443 type B and differs from type A
in parts 2 and 3. These two types were created because manufacturers
were unable to agree on a single communication interface. This leads to
complications in communication, because to make a compatible reader with
both types of standards, it must detect what type of standard uses a presented
card, before the communication starts.
It uses encryption to secure data stored in its memory. To get access to
the memory is needed cryptographic key which makes the data on the card
more secure. Every card has UID (Unique Identifier), which is programmed
by vendor and it’s not possible to rewrite it. The UID is primarily used to
establish communication between the reader and the card.
The type A standard defines that the communication is at 13.56 MHz and for
data transmission from reader to card is used 100% ASK (Amplitude Shift
Keying) modulation Miller encoding. For the opposite direction is used ASK
Active Load Modulation.
The data transfer is a half-duplex, so only one party can transmit at a
time. This standard also defines anti-collision, which enables the reader to
communicate with one card in case where more than one card is attached to
the reader.
The fourth part of this standard describes communication protocol between
the reader and the Mifare card, which supports the transmission of APDU.
The card and the reader communicate by sending a commands and responses
in a form of hexadecimal number [2].
3.6 Types of mifare cards
As it’s written above, there are many types of Mifare cards and in this
section is discussed only Mifare Classic, because this kind of card is used
in this project, and Mifare Desfire family, because it’s the successor of the
Mifare Classic card.
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3.6.1 Mifare Classic
The Mifare Classic appeared on the market at first in 1994 and in the next
few years it became the most widespread smart card in the world. Security
is proven by CRYPTO1 stream cipher, but it has been broken in 2007 as
explained further in this chapter. The card’s memory is available in three
sizes, 1, 2 and 4 kilobytes [11] [5].
Memory organization
Figure 3.4 shows memory organization of 1k variant which has 1024 bytes
of data storage, but only 752 bytes can be used for data storage. It has
EEPROM is organized in 16 sectors within 4 blocks and every block has 16
bytes. All the sectors are securely separated. Every sector’s fourth block is
called Trailer block and it’s not for user’s data, but it’s used for two access
keys Key A and Key B and access bits [5].
Figure 3.4: Mifare Classic memory organization [5]
Both keys are 6 bytes long, so it has 1012 options. If the card is completely
new, these keys are set to FF FF FF FF FF FF which is called factory
format. When you try to dump these keys, key A return zeros, because it’s
not possible to read it. Further the trailer block contains one unused byte
for user and access bits on whose state depends sector’s access conditions
and usage of data blocks in the sector. The access conditions can be set
to a few states telling us which key is used for authentication, which key is
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readable and options of another blocks. With these access bits other blocks
of the sector can be set to value blocks which allows the additional value
operations like increment, decrement, transfer and restore. This is very useful
for electronic purse.
The manufacturer block is stored in Sector 0 block 0 and it contains the
manufacturer data within card’s UID, so the whole block is read-only. The
manufacturer block is not affected by the sector’s access bits setting. The
card’s UID is 4 or 7 bytes long [5].
Memory security
Mifare Classic uses Crypto-1 stream cipher implemented in the chip
hardware for fast processing. The NXP Semiconductors used to keep the
Crypto-1 algorithm in secret, but it has been revealed and published by CCC
in 2007 [12] [11]. More about this story is in section Mifare Classic Hack.
Figure 3.5: Crypto-1 stream cipher [13]
Figure 3.5 shows the Crypto1 diagram. The cipher algorithm consists of a
LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register) with a linear feedback function f(x).
The Crypto1 is used with three pass authentication as discussed bellow in
following steps:
1) In the beginning of a card’s sector authentication the reader sends
a request for authentication of selected sector and type of selected
authentication key.
2) The card finds out if it’s possible depending on access conditions. If not,
it sends error response back. If so, it loads actual value 32-bit number
from RNG (Random Generator) and send it to the reader as a challenge
nT . At this point both sides know which key is chosen for the ciphering
of challenge and UID.
3) The secret 48-bit key is loaded into the LFSR. The generated 32-bit
challenge Rb XORs with the UID and this output string is shifted into
the state of the shift register. The filter function generates the key stream
using the generating polynomial as follows.
g(x) = x48 + x43 + x39 + x38 + x36 + x34 + x33 + x31 + x29 + x24 + x23 +
15
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x21 + x19 + x13 + x9 + x7 + x6 + x5 + 1
At this point, the encryption is activated and all incoming and outgoing
bits are XORed with the keystream. Each cycle, the function f(x)
computes one bit for the key stream out of 20 bits it gets from the LFSR.
The 18 taps of the LFSR are used to fill the first register bit on each
shift. For this, the taps are connected linearly.
4) The reader generates its own key stream and challenge nR and sends it
to the card.
5) The card deciphers the response from the reader and verifies if the
authentication was successful. If so, the card generates a new respond
and sends it to the reader [14] [5].
3.6.2 Mifare Desfire
The NXP Semiconductors introduced Mifare DESFire in 2002 and in
2006 was introduced successor Mifare DESFire EV1. In 2010 was announced
discontinuation of the MIFARE DESFire and in 2016 was introduced MIFARE
DESFire EV2. So now the DESFire family consists of Mifare DESFire EV1
and EV2 [11] [15].
The MIFARE DESFire family targets for transport or event ticketing, loyalty
and micropayment, access control, parking, student ID, multiple applications
and more [15].
"Certified with Common Criteria EAL4+ on both hardware and software
implementation." [15]
"The “DES” in the name refers to the use of DES, 2K3DES, 3K3DES and
AES hardware cryptographic engine for securing transmission data." [15]
Now there’ll be described the evolution one and further the differences against
the newer version evolution two.
Memory organization
Mifare desfire cards are available with 2, 4 and 8 kB non-volatile memory
with typical write endurance up to 500 000 cycles. This memory is organized
using flexible file system. On one card can be up to 28 applications
simultaneously and in each application can be up to 32 files. Each
application is represented by its 3 bytes AID (Application Identifier) and it
has its own access requirements. File size is determined during creation and
there is a 5 file types: standard data file, back-up data file, value file, linear
record file and cyclic record file [16].
Memory security
MIFARE DESFIRE EV1 has UID 7 bytes long in the manufacturer part
of memory, which is write-protected after being programmed by the
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manufacturer. The UID contributes to prevent cloning.
"Prior to data transmission a mutual three-pass authentication can be done
between MIFARE DESFire EV1 and PCD depending on the configuration
employing either 56-bit DES (single DES, DES), 112-bit 3DES (triple DES,
2K3DES), 168-bit 3DES (3 key triple DES, 3K3DES) or AES." [16]
So the cipher algorithm is selectable by modifying access conditions [16].
Differences between Mifare Desfire EV1 and Mifare Desfire EV2
Evolution two is newer and it has following advantages against evolution
one:
• Unlimited number of applications
• 6 file types - the new is Transaction MAC file
• Multiple Key Sets per application with fast key rolling mechanism (up
to 16 sets)
• Multiple keys assignment for each file access rights (up to 8)
• Proximity Check for protection against Relay Attacks
• It’s Common Criteria EAL5+ security certified which is the same security
certification level as demanded for smart card IC (Integrated Circuit)
products used e.g. for banking cards or electronic passports [15] [16] [17].
3.7 Mifare Classic hack
In this project is used Mifare Classic card as a key for the door lock and
also there is demonstration of the hack with the use of mfoc tool so here will
be discussed how the cipher was revealed and its vulnerabilities.
3.7.1 History
NXP held the algorithm of Crypto1 in secret, but researchers Henryk Plotz
and Karsten Nohl at the University of Virginia revealed and then published
the Crypto1 stream ciher and demonstrated a way to crack this encryption
in December 2007. NXP tried to stop the full disclosure of Crypto1 cipher
by judicial process, but court decided to allow the publication. Then were
created some tools for hacking the Mifare Classic card. At this time this kind
of cards was used worldwide in various applications such as a payment cards,
public transportation and access control systems. Mifare Classic card is still
being produced and sold today [12] [18] [13] [11].
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3.8 How the cryptography was revealed
Crypto1 is implemented in chip hardware for faster ciphering process. So
at first was needed to get access to the chip embedded in the plastic card.
This was done with use of acetone [13].
"Once we had isolated the silicon chips, we removed each successive layer
through mechanical polishing, which we found easier to control than chemical
etching." [13]
The chip is formed by six layers and the lowest contains the transistor gates.
They took pictures of it, example is shown in figure 3.6. Each type of
transistor gate has a different shape, so they made templates for all kinds
of all transistor gates founded on the chip (about 70 types of gates). With
use of MATLAB they implemented a template matching of templates with
pictures of the chip and finally they found components of the cipher in the
corner of the chip. After reconstruction of the connection between all the
transistor gates, they made the diagram of the Crypto1 stream cipher as its
shown above in figure 3.5 [13].
Figure 3.6: Picture of the transistor layer [13]
3.8.1 Weakness of Crypto1 algorithm
The 6-byte long ciphering key makes possible brute-force attack. Karsten
Nohl and David Evans discuss how it’s possible to try all possible keys within
fifty minutes in [13].
Further weakness causes the random number generator (RNG designation
in the Crypto1 diagram) which generates only 65536 numbers with a period
0.6 second and it generates every time the same numbers in the same order
and always starts at the beginning. It allows an attacker to pre-calculate a
generated number with this constant initial condition. Each number generated
by RNG depends on the quantity of clock cycles between the time when the
reader was turned on and the time when the random number is requested.
Therefore, it’s possible to control the generated number and by generating
repeatedly the same numbers can be recovered keys from communication [13].
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RFID readers
This chapter describes the RFID reader principle, interfaces and usage.
Further there are described readers, which where used for this project.
4.1 General
"A software application that is designed to read data from a contactless
data carrier (transponder) or write data to a contactless data carrier,
requires a contactless reader as an interface." [2]
"The reader’s main functions are therefore to activate the data carrier
(transponder), structure the communication sequence with the data carrier,
and transfer data between the application software and a contactless data
carrier. All features of the contactless communication, i.e. making the
connection, and performing anticollision and authentication procedures, are
handled entirely by the reader." [2]
Figure 4.1: Diagram of master-slave communication between application, reader
and transponder [2]
Figure 4.1 shows communication diagram between application, reader
and transponder. In the wireless communication between the reader and
the transponder, the reader is master and the transponder slave. In the
communication between the application and the reader, the application is
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master and the reader is slave. The application with its software can be for
example in a computer with a program or development board with a firmware
which handles an access control system. In next section is described a number
of reader interfaces for the wired communication between the application and
reader [2].
4.2 Reader interfaces
In this section are described common reader interfaces for communication
with a master, including interfaces of readers which were used in this project.
4.2.1 Wiegand
Wiegand interface is very commonly used for RFID readers. Data are
buffered into two separated signal lines before transmission over the wiegand
interface. One line carries "1" and the other one "0", so these lines are typically
called DATA1 and DATA0. For this operation of separating "1" and "0" into
two lines is used a digital buffering circuit. Both data lines are held high and
are pulled low when the current logic state is presented. So the logical "0" is
represented by lowering the DATA0 signal, while the signal DATA1 remains
high [19].
Figure 4.2: Wiegand signal [19]
Figure 4.2 shows how binary number 010 is presented, with a typical
impulse width 50 microseconds and distance between two closest pulses is
1 millisecond. The actual values of timing, transmission rate, tolerance
and voltage levels are determined by the device manufacturer.A short pause
usually about 500 milliseconds follows after every data packet [19].
4.2.2 SPI
The SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) is a very common serial interface for
interfacing various electrical devices. The SPI enables a full duplex
master-slave communication typically used at short distances. In one SPI
connection is one master and one or multiple slaves and the whole
communication is controlled by the master. The SPI uses four signal lines as
listed in table 4.1 with a brief description [20] [21].
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SS (Slave Select) signal sent by master to enable or
disable specific slave.
SCK (Serial Clock) clock signal generated by master for
synchronized communication
MOSI (Master Output, Slave
Input)
line is used to send data from the
master to the slave
MISO (Master Input, Slave
Output)
line is used to send data from the
slave to the master
Table 4.1: Definition of signal lines used for SPI
The master defines the transmission rate by setting frequency of the clock
signal. Different devices support different maximal transmission rates. In
one SPI communication the frequency of the clock signal must be suited to
the slowest device [20].
For example the MFRC522 reader used in this project supports transmission
speed up to 10 MBit/s [22].
The master keeps SS signal pulled high and when it’s pulled low, the
communication with the slave, to which is connected, is activated. In case
there is only one master and one slave, all these signal lines are connected
directly from the master to the slave. In case there are more slaves, the
master needs more SS signal lines for each slave to be able to activate slaves
individually [20] [21].
Figure 4.3: SPI diagram [20]
Devices with enabled SPI must have 3 exact registers as follows:
. SPI Control Register - contains eight bits that tell us about actual SPI
configuration and can be rewritten by the master. This configuration
contain: Interrupt enable, SPI enable, data order, Master/Slave select,
clock polarity, clock phase and clock rate.
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. SPI Status Register - also contains eight bits, but only three are used.
First is SPI interrupt flag and is set when SS pin is an input and is
driven low by master. Write Collision Flag is set if the slave writes on
SPI Data Register during data transfer. Last used bit is set to double
the SPI speed.
. SPI Data Shift Register. In figure 4.3 is shown how the data are shifted
in both directions simultaneously. Master shifts out data from its register
to slave and shifts in data from the slave and that’s the way how the
data are transmitted [20].
4.2.3 I2C
Inter Integrated Circuit (I2C) is a master-slave, half duplex serial bus
invented by Philips Semiconductor (now NXP Semiconductors) widely used
by almost all IC manufacturers usually to connect devices at short distances
like EEPROMs, signal converters, sensors or other peripheral devices. The
I2C protocol supports four transmission rates as shown in table 4.2 [23] [24].
Standard-mode (Sm) 100 kbit/s
Fast-mode (Fm) 400 kbit/s
Fast-mode Plus (Fm+) 1 Mbit/s
High-speed mode (Hs-mode) 3.4 Mbit/s
Table 4.2: I2C transmission rates
The I2C interface uses only two wires: SCL (clock signal line) and SDA
(data signal line). Each clock cycle one bit is transferred, so the bit rate
equals to the frequency of clock signal. Transferred data are split into 8-bit
packets. These features make it very simple to implement, so there is no need
for special I2C hardware controller like for SPI. In one I2C connection can be
one or multiple masters and slaves [23] [24]. Figure 4.4 shows how multiple
masters and slaves is connected.
Figure 4.4: I2C diagram
"All devices are connected to the bus via an open collector or open drain.
With this connection, the device may output either a logic zero or nothing at
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all (the output is in the high impedance state)." [24]
That’s why both lines SCL and SCK are connected via pull-up resistors to a
positive source of power supply. When a device outputs "0", the line voltage
will be set to low. If the bus is free, both lines are set to high. Pull-up
resistors prevent short-circuit current when "0" is presented and it’s resistance
is typically in range from 1k Ohms to 10k Ohms [24].
Each slave device has a 7-bit address, which needs to be unique on the bus
and it is set bet by master. When the master is to communicate with a slave,
it starts to generate clock signal and it sends a start condition, which is one
packet containing the slave’s address and one bit which indicates data
direction, "0" indicates write and "1" indicates a request for data. Depending
on this one bit the next packet will send the master or the slave on SDA line.
It’s also possible to have a 10-bit addresses for a larger number of slaves. In
this case the master’s call command is separated into two packets.
During the communication the master can resend the start condition, that
changes communication mode.
Once all the data were sent through the SDA, the master sends stop
condition and stops generating clock signal, so other devices know that the
communication has ended. At this point the I2C bus is free so other master
device may use it [23] [24].
4.2.4 Serial UART
The Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) peripheral in
accordance with TL16C550 standard is a block of circuitry implementing
communication between parallel and serial interfaces. Therefore, it
implements serial-to-parallel conversion of data received from a peripheral
device and parallel-to-serial conversion of data received from a parallel device
[25] [26].
"On one end of the UART is a bus of eight-or-so data lines (plus some
control pins), on the other is the two serial wires - RX and TX." [26]
Figure 4.5: Simplified UART interface [26]
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So with use of UART the data received from peripheral device are converted
to parallel expression and the data received from the parallel device are
converted to peripheral expression. The communication is synchronized by
clock signal (CLK). Various devices supports various CLK speeds [25] [26].
4.3 HID Prox Point Plus
The Prox Point Plus reader, made by American manufacturer HID Global,
is compatible with HID proximity cards with transmit frequency 125 kHz
FSK modulation and card formats up to 85 bits.
There are two types of this reader: 6005B and 6008B, which differ in supported
interfaces for communication with a host. Type 6005B supports wiegand and
type 6008B supports clock-and-data [27] [28].
Figure 4.6: Photo of ProxPoint Plus reader [28]
It has integrated a beeper and multi color LED which can be controlled by
master. Typical maximal read range is 7.5 cm. Power supply can be 5-16
VDC with peak current consumption 75 mA.
In this work is used type 6005B, which has two wires DATA-0 and DATA-1
for the wiegand interface, power supply wires VDC and GND and wires for
controlling the LED [27] [28].
4.4 NXP MFRC522 reader
The MFRC522 reader made by NXP Semiconductors with communication
operating frequency 13.56 MHz supports 14443 Type A (Mirare) and NTAG
at range up to 40 mm.
Figure 4.7: MFRC522 reader block diagram [22]
Figure 4.7 shows the reader diagram. Antenna with the analog interface
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forms RF interface for wireless communication with a card. The contactless
UART controls the communication protocol requirements for the host which
is a serial port [22].
"The contactless UART manages the protocol requirements for the
communication protocols in cooperation with the host. The FIFO buffer
ensures fast and convenient data transfer to and from the host and the
contactless UART and vice versa." [22]
The MFRC522 reader supports SPI, I2C and serial UART for interfacing a
host. The reader identifies the host’s interface automatically and then the
reader’s interface is automatically set. This is done when it’s connected to
power supply or when the host sends to the reader command hard reset.
In this project was chosen SPI which enables transmission speed up to
10 Mbit/s [22].
4.5 ACS ACR122U reader
The ACR122U reader is made by Advanced Card Systems (ACS) company
from Hong Kong developing smart cards and smart card readers.
The ACR122U reader communicates at 13.56 MHz with all smart cards
compliant with ISO/IEC 14443 Type A and B, MIFARE, FeliCa, and all
4 types of NFC ISO/IEC 18092) tags with transmission rate up to 424 kbps
in typical communication range up to 50 mm between the reader and tag.
It has integrated bi-color LED and buzzer, both can be controlled by a host.
The ACR122U has USB 2.0 full speed of up to 12 Mbps with supported
CCID protocol (Chip Card Interface Device), which allows a smart card to
be directly connected to a computer or other similar device. It supports
application programming interfaces PC/SC and CT-API on operating systems:
Windows, Win CE 5.0 and 6.0, Linux, Mac OS, and Android [29] [30].
Figure 4.8: ACR122U reader [30]
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Microcontroller development boards
Oﬄine access control systems can use microcontroller development board
as a central unit as it is in this work. This chapter discusses basic properties
of microcontroller development boards and also this chapter describes the
boards used in this work.
5.1 General
Microcontroller development board is a PCB (Printed Circuit Board) with a
microcontroller. Basically it’s a processor connected to circuity and hardware
designed to facilitate working with the microcontroller. The board circuits
usually contain power circuit, LEDs, pushbutton and interface like USB to
connect the board to a computer for easy way to program the microcontroller
from a computer. Additionally, the board may contain some hardware like
bluetooth or WiFi module, LCD display etc. On the PCB are I/O pins with
various abilities for usage [31] [32]. Table 5.1 shows list of pin abbreviations
sufficient for boards used in this work.
Shortcut Explanation
D Digital I/O
A Analog input
PWM Pulse Width Modulation output
INT Interrupt
USB+/- It’s connected to USB port
AREF Analog Reference - configures the reference
voltage used for analog input
Vin Input power supply
RXD, TXD pins for serial UART
MISO, MOSI, SCK, SS pins for SPI
SDA, SCK pins for I2C
Table 5.1: Pin abbreviations [31]
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5.2 Arduino
Arduino is a company which manufactures family of open-source
microcontroller development boards, hardware and software [33].
5.2.1 Arduino IDE
The Arduino company provides a programming interface Arduino IDE
(integrated development environment) for easy to program Arduino boards,
but many other boards are also compatible. It aims to write code, compile
it and directly upload the code to the bard. Therefore, it contains text
editor for writing the code, a message area for responses about compilation
to the programmer, a text console, a toolbar with buttons for common
functions and a series of menus. The programming language in Arduino IDE
for programming microcontroller board is C and C++ with use of special
rules to organize code with supplied library "Wiring" which includes many
input/output functions [34] [33]. To make a program with this library are
needed at least two functions. First is function setup() which runs only once
and contains initial environment settings. The second function is loop() which
is called repeatedly while the board is powered on [35].
The Arduino IDE itself is written in java programming language and it’s
available on platforms Linux, Windows and Mac OS X [36].
5.2.2 Memory
The Arduino and many other development boards are based on
microcontroller with three kinds of memory.
Flash memory
This is the place, where programmer uploads his compiled program. This
memory is non-volatile, so the inviolable when the power is switched off.
SRAM
In this memory the uploaded program stores variables and manipulates
it. This memory is volatile, so the content will be lost when the power is
switched off.
EEPROM
This non-volatile memory is empty until the programmer uses it for storing
some information [37].
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5.3 Arduino UNO
The Adruino UNO is a development board based on microcontroller
ATmega328P. It has 20 pins whose description can be found in table 5.2 and
the Arduino also contains pins for power supply 5 V, 3.3 V and GND. The
I/O pin’s operating voltage is 5 volts with maximal supplied DC current per
I/O pin 20 mA and for 3.3V pin the current is 50 mA.
The ATmega328P combines 32 kB flash memory, 2 kB SRAM, 1 kB
EEPROM with clock speed 16 MHz. The Arduino Uno board can be
powered via the USB connection or with an external power supply connected
to Vin pin, which can be from 6 to 20 volts, but from 7 to 12 volts is
recommended. The Arduino Uno enables interfaces SPI, I2C, UART TTL
(5V) and USB-B for communication with a computer, another board,
microcontroller or other device [31].
Arduino pins ATmega328P pins features
0 PD0 D0 / RXD
1 PD1 D1 / TXD
2 PD2 D2 / INT0
3 PD3 D3 / INT1 / PWM
4 PD4 D4
5 PD5 D5PWM / PWM
6 PD6 D6 / PWM
7 PD7 D7
8 PD8 D8
9 PD9 D9 / PWM
10 PB1 D10 / SS / PWM
11 PB2 D11 / MOSI / PWM
12 PB3 D12 / MISO
13 PB4 D13 / SCK
AREF - AREF
A0 PC0 D14 / A0
A1 PC1 D15/ A1
A2 PC2 D16 / A2
A3 PC3 D17 / A3
A4 PC4 D18 / A4 / SDA
A5 PC5 D19 / A5 / SCL
Table 5.2: Arduino UNO pins [31]
5.4 Digispark USB development board
The digispark is a very small and cheap (can be bought for less than $2)
development board developed by Digistump based on Attiny85 microcontroller
compatible with Arduino IDE. It can be powered via built-in USB or external
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source connected to Vin pin, which can be from 7 to 35 volts, but 12 or less
is recommended.
Figure 5.1: Digispark USB development board [38]
The Attiny85 is a microcontroller designed by Atmel with 8 kB flash
memory 512 B EEPROM and 512 B SRAM. The CPU speed is 20 MIPS and
it supports interfaces SPI and I2C.
The Attiny85 has 8 pins connected to digispark’s pins whose features are
described in table 5.3 in accordance with 5.1. Pin 3 and 4 are directly
connected to USB+/-, so they can be used only if the Digispark is not
communicating via USB [40] [38] [39].
Pin features
P0 D0 / PWM0 / AREF /MOSI / SDA
P1 D1 / PWM1 / MISO
P2 D2 / A1 / SCK /SCL / INT0
P3 D3 / A3 / USB+
P4 D4 / A2 / USB- / PWM4
P5 D5 / A0
5V Power source - 5V
GND Power source - ground
Vin Input power supply (7-35V)
Table 5.3: Digispark pins [39]
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Part II
Practical part
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Chapter 6
Design of the access control system
This chapter describes design of the access control system with NXP RFID
technology at 13.56 MHz.
6.1 Part list
• Arduino Uno development board
• NXP MFRC522 reader
• Mifare Classic 1K
• Relay 1 channel 5VDC
• Solenoid 12V 1A
• LED two color RG antiparallel
• Buzzer
• Press button - Microswitch SMD 1-pole switching ON-OFF
• R - resistor 4k7
This system contains LED and buzzer for the feedback, so user knows what
the system actually does. The press button is here for the system editing
(as explained further in the text). The relay switches power supply for the
solenoid, which controls the door.
The Mifare Classic card (with 4 bytes long UID only) is chosen, because
it’s very popular in the world for various applications, such as access control
systems and it costs about $0.30 per one when it’s purchased in amount of 50
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pieces. A compatible reader with the Mifare card is chosen MFRC522 which
costs about $1.89, so this RFID technology is quite inexpensive.
The development board requirements are: reliability, at least 10 I/O pins
available, 3.3 and 5 volts power supply for powering the connected components
and memory, for user data, because we need to store UID of every authorized
card. Therefore, Arduino Uno based on ATmega328P appears as the best
solution.
6.2 Diagram
Figure 6.1: Access control system block diagram
As shown in figure 6.1 there is needed power source with two DC outputs.
One 5V / 100mA for Arduino and 12V / 1A for the solenoid. The Arduino
board can be powered by USB-B and all other parts are powered by the
Arduino.
Pin Connected line
4 relay
5 buzzer
6 press button
7 LED green
8 LED red
9 MFRC522 - RST
10 MFRC522 - SDA(SS)
11 MFRC522 - MOSI
12 MFRC522 - MISO
13 MFRC522 - SCK
Table 6.1: Arduino UNO pin connection
The MFRC522 reader is connected to Arduino via SPI and for the
communication is used Arduino SPI default library. For controlling the
reader is used this library [41]. More about SPI and MFRC522 reader is in
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chapter RFID readers. The Arduino Uno has predefined pins 10-13 for SPI
and this library allows changing SS pin and in addition it has RST (reset)
pin for reseting the SPI configuration. For wiring the reader is used it’s
datasheet [22].
The door is controlled by the solenoid which is switched by the relay and the
relay is connected to I/O pin of the Arduino Uno. The solenoid needs 12 V,
1A DC power supply.
The buzzer is connected to digital output of Arduino and it generates tones
depending on switching frequency between digital low and high.
The antiparallel two color RG LED operates at 2.2 V, 20 mA (max. 25 mA).
Arduino’s maximal DC Current per I/O Pin is 20 mA so it can be directly
connected to digital pins. To set the LED to light red or green color, one pin
has to be set to high and the other is set to low. That means on one pin is
delivered 5 volts and the other is grounded.
Button connection
In figure 6.2 is shown connection of the button to the Arduino Uno board.
Arduino’s pin is defined as input and it reports digital high on this input if a
voltage there is greater than 3 volts and digital low if a voltage there is lower
than 3 volts.
Five volts power supply is connected over the resistor to the pin, where the
voltage is actually being sensed. If the button is not pressed, Arduino will
report digital high on this pin. When the button is pressed, there is a short
circuit over the button to the ground and delivered voltage on the sensing pin
is close to zero, so at this point it reports digital low. Short circuit current is
limited to approximately 1 mA by resistor R = 4.7 kohm.
Figure 6.2: Button circuit connection
6.3 Program description
In this section is described how the software is designed and how the system
works. Authorized cards are divided into admin and user cards. Both are
used as a key to the door and the admin card has in addition ability to add
or remove other cards from the system.
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6.3.1 Card authentication
To make it as much secure as possible with this kind of card, there are two
kinds of verifying.
1) UID of every authorized card is stored in Arduino’s EEPROM whose
size is 1024 bytes. The card’s UID is 4 bytes long, so the system has
capacity of 256 authorized cards. The system was not tested with cards,
which have UID 7 bytes long, but probably it would also work and in the
Arduino’s EEPROM would be only saved the first four bytes of the UID.
When the authentication starts, the Arduino looks in its EEPROM if
the UID of the scanned card is there. That’s for the case, that some
user would lose his card. Who finds it would be able to pass through
the door, while in this design we can wipe out the EEPROM and then
add all the cards to the system.
2) The Mifare Classic card provides cryptography to protect the user’s data
written on the card, so in the next part of the card authentication it
reads a number written on the card. This number is stored in sector 2,
block 8. Sum of all 16 bytes in this block gives a number and according
to this number is recognized admin and user card. User’s number is 2137
and admin’s is 2343. Those numbers were chosen randomly. The sector
2 is enciphered with key A: 10 20 30 40 50 60 which is needed to get
access to this sector.
Figure 6.3 shows the structure of the card authentication. This loop persists,
when the system is in normal state. If something goes wrong during the
authentication, system evaluates that attached card is invalid and access is
denied, speaker beeps a negative tone and the LED lights red for a second.
When a card is authenticated as user or admin, the buzzer beeps positive
tone, LED lights green for a two seconds and the solenoid releases the door.
If the authenticated card is user, it returns back to start. If the authenticated
card is admin, additionally the system waits 4 seconds if the button will
be pressed and how long. If so, it enters to the system editing loop and it
behaves depending on how long was the button pressed as shown in 6.4. To
recognize if a presented card was recognized as user or admin, the buzzer
beeps a little longer for the admin card than for the user card.
35
...................................6.3. Program description
Figure 6.3: Flowchart of the card authentication.
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6.3.2 Editing the system
By presenting the admin card and pressing the button can be added a new
user or admin card to the system or deleted any card from the system and
delete all the cards at once from the system. It’s done by pressing the button
for a specific duration. Figure 6.4 shows the editing procedure.
Figure 6.4: The system editing flowchart.
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When the admin card is authenticated, the system gives feedback by the
buzzer and LED as written upwards and then it waits for four seconds if the
button will be pressed. If not, no edits will happen and it returns back to
authentication loop. After every operation of system editing it returns back
to the editing loop, so it gives feedback by speaker and LED and waits again
four seconds if the button will be pressed.
Add or delete card from the system
If the button is pressed shortly (no longer than three seconds), the system
waits 30 seconds for any card to be presented. If no card is presented in this
duration the editing loop ends, LED turns off and it goes to the authentication
loop, but if a card is presented, it looks if the card is already in the system.
If so, the card will be removed from the system. If the presented card is not
already in the system, the card will be added to the system and as user.
In authentication loop when an admin card is presented and the button is
pressed shortly, the next presented card will be removed or added as user to
the system depending on if the UID of the card is in EEPROM.
If the system evaluates that it’s the same admin card, which was presented in
the authentication loop to enter to the system editing loop, it won’t remove
this card from the system and it jumps at the start of the system editing loop.
This ability is not shown in the diagram because it doesn’t fit there. This
ability is implemented here because irresponsible removing cards would may
cause, that there is no admin card therefore there would be no possibility of
adding or removing cards anymore.
Add admin card to the system
If the button is pressed longer than three seconds and not longer than ten
seconds, he system waits 30 seconds for any card to be presented. If no card
is presented in this duration the editing loop ends. But if a card is presented,
it will be added to the system and set as admin.
Remove all the cards from the system at once and multiple card
adding to the system
If the button is pressed longer than ten seconds, the system’s memory is
gonna be wiped out. The LED lights orange and buzzer beeps falling tone
and the tone remains until any new card is presented to add the card to the
system and set as admin. At this point the system enters the multiple card
adding loop.
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6.3.3 Multiple card adding
In case when the system detects that the EEPROM is clear, so no card is
authorized, it enters to the multiple card adding loop as shown in figure 6.5.
It simply sets as admin all the presented cards until the button is pressed,
then all the next presented cards are set as user and when the button is
presented again, it quits this loop end enters to the authentication loop.
Every time when the system is powered on, it checks if the EEPROM is
clear. If so, it enters to this loop, thus user of this system has an easy way to
add multiple cards to the system, when it’s brand new.
Figure 6.5: The multiple card adding flowchart.
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Chapter 7
Design of the access control system -
reduced and smaller solution
This chapter describes the design of smaller solution than the solution in
previous chapter. The main requirement for this system is minimum size for
the best practical use.
7.1 Part list
• Digispark USB Development Board
• HID ProxPoint Plus 6005B reader
• HID ProxCard II - 26 bits version
• Relay 1 channel
• Solenoid 12V 1A
The RFID technology HID reader with the HID card is chosen, because
it’s directly made for access control systems and it’s widely used for this
application. The reader can be found on the market for about $90 and one
Prox Card cost about $3 when it’s purchased in amount of 50 pieces. So it’s
much more expensive than the NXP RFID technology used for the system
design in the previous chapter.
The HID reader has integrated buzzer and multicolor LED, so there is no
need of these components in this system design anymore. It’s preprogrammed,
that when a card is presented, the reader’s integrated buzzer beeps and it
sends bits of the presented card via two wiegand wires.
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The door is controlled by the solenoid which is switched by the relay and
the relay is connected to I/O pin of the Digispark development board, so it’s
the same as it is in the previous system design in the previous chapter.
The requirements for the development board are: reliability, small
dimensions, at least 5 I/O pins, 5 VDC power supply for the reader and the
relay, memory for user data, because we need to store numbers of all
authorized cards. The Digispark development board based on Attiny85
appears as the best solution, because it fulfills all the conditions and it’s very
small and cheap (It can be bought for less than $2).
7.2 Diagram
This system uses the same relay and solenoid as it is in the previous system
in the previous chapter. The Digispark board is powered via USB, the HID
reader and relay is powered by the Digispark and the solenoid needs power
supply 12 V, 1 A.
Figure 7.1: Access control system - smaller solution
P0 HID DATA-0
P1 LED red
P2 HID DATA-1
P3 LED green
P4 relay
Table 7.1: Digispark pin connection
The wiegand signal on the reader’s wires DATA1 and DATA0 has a very
short pulses, so the best solution to sense these pulses is to use pin change
interrupt function available for interrupt pins but the Digispark provides only
one interrupt pin and there are needed two. For this reason is used external
library PinChangeInterrupt [42] which provides interrupt function for all pins
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of the Digispark.
The integrated LED in the HID reader has three colors and for every color
it has it’s own controlling wire. In this project is needed only red and green
color, so the led is controlled by only two wires. To set the LED to light one
of these colors, wire of the color must be grounded. Thus, it is solved in that
both wires for red and green color are set to HIGH in idle state and when
the LED should glow in some color, wire of the color is set to LOW.
For wiring the HID reader is used source [28].
7.3 Program description
Authorized cards in this system are divided into admin and user cards,
which is the same as in previous chapter, but only the user card is used as
the key for accessing the door. The admin card is here for the system editing.
Numbers of all authorized cards are stored in the EEPROM of the Attiny85.
These numbers are there stored as unsigned inteegers covering two bytes
and the EEPROM is size 512 bytes. Numbers of user cards are stored on
addresses from 0 to 399, and admin card numbers are stored on addresses
from 400 till the end, so it’s up to 512. It follows from this that this device
has capacity of 199 user cards and 56 admin cards.
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7.3.1 First turned on
When it’s the first time turned on, the system evaluate that its EEPROM
is clear, so it enters to the admin card adding loop. The LED lights green
and all the presented cards are added to EEPROM as admin. This admin
card adding ends by presenting the first presented card, then it enters to the
authentication loop. To add some user cards, some admin card must be
presented as shown in following diagrams.
Figure 7.2: This flowchart runs when the system is first time turned on, so it
has clean EEPROM.
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7.3.2 Card authentication
This is the normal state of the system. It simply reads the number of the
presented card and then it looks if the number is already stored in the
system’s memory. If so, it opens the door or enters to the user editing loop
depending on if the presented card is user or admin. If some admin card is
presented twice in a row, it enters to the admin card list editing and if the
same admin card is presented again, it returns back to the authentication
loop.
Figure 7.3: This flowchart shows authentication loop which runs when the
system is not in editing state and any card is presented to the reader.
44
...................................7.3. Program description
7.3.3 User card list editing
When some admin card is presented in the authentication loop, It enters
the user card list editing. The next presented cards are added to EEPROM
as user if they already are not so or removed from the EEPROM if they
already are there as user. This loop ends and it jumps to authentication
loop, when the same admin card, which was presented at the beginning is
presented again.
Figure 7.4: This flowchart shows the user card list editing loop.
If no card is presented longer than 30 seconds, the editing loop ends and
it jumps to card authentication loop. When it enters to the user card list
editing, the LED lights green and when it enters back to the authentication
loop the led turns off, but when some cards are added or removed from the
system, the LED signalizes color transition as shown in the diagram.
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7.3.4 Admin card list editing
When some admin card is presented twice in a row in the authentication
loop, it enters to the admin card list editing. The next presented cards are
added as admin if they already are not so or removed from the EEPROM if
they already are there as admin. This loop ends and it jumps to
authentication loop, when the same admin card, which was presented at the
beginning, is presented again.
Figure 7.5: This flowchart shows the admin card list editing loop.
Following is the same as in the user card list editing. If no card is presented
longer than 30 seconds, the editing loop ends and it jumps to card
authentication loop. When it enters to the admin card list editing, the LED
lights green and when it enters back to the authentication loop the led turns
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off, but when some cards are added or removed from the system, the LED
signalizes color transition as shown in the diagram.
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Chapter 8
Hacking the electronic door lock system
This chapter includes discussion of security of the designed access control
systems from two previous chapters.
8.1 Possibilities of hacking access control systems
One way to pass through access control system is to make a clone of the
card which is used as a key. To execute this, the hacker needs to get access
to the card used in the system, to be able to scan data from that card. Some
RFID cards provide encryption like Mifare cards based on ISO/IEC 14443 to
prevent unauthorized reading data from the card. However, the cryptography
of some cards such as Mifare Classic has been broken by researchers who are
analyzing vulnerabilities of the cryptography.
The other way to pass through the access control system is to break into the
case where is the central unit. The hacker in this case has an opportunity to
program the central unit and control the electronic door lock by its controlling
wire.
8.2 Mifare Classic hack documentation
In this section is documentation of the Mifare Classic hack to prove that
it’s possible to reveal enciphering keys and data on the card.
For this hack was used Linux distribution Ubuntu, version 16.04 LTS, reader
ACS ACR122U from the chapter RFID readers. Sample card for the hack
was chosen the card used in the electronic door lock in chapter 6.
To set up a "hacking lab" were installed following tools:
.1. pcsc-tools [43] which is the driver for the reader.
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............................ 8.2. Mifare Classic hack documentation.2. libnfc [44] which is a free open source library, SDK and API for RFID
and NFC applications supporting ISO/IEC 14443 Type A and Type B,
FeliCa, Jewel/Topaz tags and Data Exchange Protocol (P2P) as target
and as initiator..3. mfoc [45], Mifare Classic Offine Cracker, which is an open source tool
depending on libnfc for cracking Mifare Classic cards, written by
Nethemba Szetei and Pavol Luptak with contribution by others.
At this point is important to successfully install compatible versions of
mfoc and libnfc. For this hack was used mfoc version 0.10.7 and libnfc version
libnfc-1.7.1-107-g8e5ec4a. When these tools works properly, the ACR122U
reader is plugged in the PC, the card is attached to the reader, than everything
is ready, so in terminal is send command which starts the hacking.
mfoc -P 500 -O dump.mfd
Where -P 500 means probe each sector up to 500 times and -O dump.mfd
means create a mfd file and seve here output. If the attempt is successful, it
will reveal keys of each sector and it prints out whole content of the card and
in addition it saves the card content to the dump.mfd file.
Figure 8.1: Mifare Classic Hack - terminal output part 1.1. Figure 8.1 shows, that some details about the card are announced and
then a few common keys including factory key are tried to unlock every
single sector as a key A and key B.
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Figure 8.2: Mifare Classic Hack - terminal output part 2.2. Figure 8.2 shows, that it lists keys with which it managed to authenticate
individual sectors. Be noticed, that all the sectors are using factory key
as a Key A and B except sector 02 so this sector will be probed 500
times.
Figure 8.3: Mifare Classic Hack - terminal output part 3.3. Figure 8.3 shows, that the sector with unknown keys is being probed by
counting the RNG cycles to predict the generated number, so distance
means order of generated number. At this time it took only three probes
and only a few seconds, but in other cases this step can take even a few
minutes. Untill when the key A is known, it also reads and prints key B
of this sector.
Figure 8.4: Mifare Classic Hack - terminal output part 4.4. And finally it dumps whole card with keys. Figure 8.4 shows part of this
message including sector 02, because only this one contains useful data
and all other sectors are in factory format. So the sector 02 uses key A:
102030405060, key B: 95f4fa4172cd and the useful data are in the block
08.
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8.2.1 Attempt of hack a strange Mifare Classic card
To verify the functionality of these tools for dracking cards, the hack was
also implemented on ISIC (International Student Identity Card) shown in
figure 8.5. It’s 1k variant and the card is already being used as electronic
wallet for canteen and cafeteria, access control system and as a key for
electronic door lock of the school buildings.
Figure 8.5: Sample ISIC card used for hack
The hack was also useful. All sectors are in factory format accept sector 01
and useful data are stored only in block 04. In figure 8.6 is shown part of
the final message including the sector 01 and as you can see it uses key A:
bd493a3962b6 and the secret data are at the begining of block 04 which is 54
54 58 4d 57 51 4d.
Figure 8.6: ISIC card hack - important part of terminal output
According to standard ASCII (American Standard Code for Information
Interchange) these bytes means TTXMWQM which is written on the card
below the barcode. All the data about individual student must be stored on
server and the card is only used to provide the 7 bytes long code.
8.3 Security of the HID RFID technology used in
the second system design
The HID Prox Card II is read only, but also on the Chinese market is
available writable Prox Card II and writing device [46], so it’s possible to
clone these cards.
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If the hacker does not have the card and he doesn’t know the correct card
number, there is an option how to get the number, but it’s applicable only
for the case when it’s possible to remove the reader from the wall and hide
behind the reader some sensing device. So the hacker needs to tear the
reader out of the wall and connect to the wiegand wires of the reader some
device which can sense the wiegand signal from the reader’s wires and store
card numbers in memory, for example some small development board like the
Digispark or Arduino Micro. When somebody presents a card to the reader
to open the door, the hacker’s sensing device catches the card number and
saves it in it’s memory. Then the hacker takes his device then and he has the
correct card numbers.
If the hacker has access to the wiegand wires of the reader, he can also
bypass the RF interface and directly emulate the reader by sending the card
number by his device to the readers’s wiegand signal lines.
8.4 Conclussions of the card cloning
So it’s possible to read whole content of any Mifare Classic card and write
the data to another card to make a clone. But there is one more thing which
makes it difficult to make a perfect clone. The manufacturer data stored in
sector 0 block 0 including UID are not writeable. However, there are cards
on the Chinese market with possibility to overwrite the manufacturer block
thus UID too with price less than 1$ per one piece.
It follows from that both types of cards, Mifare Classic and Prox Card
II can be cloned and in some cases where the HID reader can be removed
from the wall, it’s possible catch the correct card numbers and bypass the RF
interface. However, to clone a card we need to make a scan of the card and
to scan the Mifare Classic card can take even about a few minutes because
of cracking the cryptography while scanning the Prox Card II can be done
in less than a second, because there is no protection, thus it can be done
through the purse in public transport and the card user would not notice that
somebody scanned his card. To prevent it, on the market are available RFID
signal blocking wallets, which is not more expensive then common wallet.
8.5 Other options of hacking the designed
systems
The electromechanical door lock system or solenoid, which controls the
door is switched by relay, which has wire connected to the central unit and if
the signal on this wire is set to HIGH state, there is delivered 5 volts power
supply and it releases the door and when the signal on this line is set to LOW
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state, its grounded and the door is locked.
If the hacker get access to the microcontroller central unit, he would be able
to program it. And set the signal for the door lock system to HIGH state so
the door would be released.
If the hacker get access to the wire which controls the electromechanical door
lock system or solenoid, he would be able to open the door by connecting
required power supply to these wires, which is 12 V, 1 A for the solenoid used
in this work.
It follows that to make secure system, there must be no possibility of getting
access to the central unit, wires of the reader or wires of the electromagnetic
door lock. If these rules are upheld and the hacker don’t know anything
about the data stored on authorized cards in the system, he is unable to pass
through the door.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
In this work were designed two access control systems with different RFID
technologies and features.
The first designed system has central unit Arduino Uno based on
ATmega328P, and uses Mifare Classic card as a key to the door. The
MFRC522 reader made by NXP was chosen as an interface to the data on
the card. This reader is inexpensive (it costs less then $2), however, it
doesn’t contain any components like a LED or buzzer to get feedback to the
user, so these components are added externally. For easy to edit the system,
it has a press button, which is active four seconds after presenting the admin
card, so both types of cards, admin and user are used as a key to the door
and admin card has moreover ability to edit the system. That means that
with use of admin card can be added or removed any admin or user card.
Requirements for the second system design are simplicity and small
dimensions. So it uses HID reader, which has integrated buzzer and LED, so
there is no need for components for the feedback to the user. So there can be
used board with only a few pins for interfacing the HID reader and one pin
for controlling the door. That’s why the Digispark development board based
on Attiny85 is used as a central unit of this system. There is no button for
easy to edit the list of authorized cards, so admin cards are used only for the
system editing and user cards are used as a key to the door.
A great benefit of this device is that it’s very small, which makes it easy to
install and possibility to use it for applications with a bad space condition.
Both system works on the purpose, that they store list of all authorized
cards in the memory of the central unit microcontroller, but the device with
Mifare cards uses moreover memory authentication and reading a number
stored in the card’s memory for greater security. The device with Mifare
cards stores 4 bytes long UID of all authorized cards and the ATmega328P
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provides EEPROM with size of 1024 bytes, therefore this device has capacity
of 256 authorized cards. The device with the HID Prox Card stores number
of every authorized card as unsigned 2-byte integer and the Attiny85 provides
EEPROM with size of 512 bytes. This memory is divided into space for user
cards and spece for admin cards, hence the capacity of 256 cards is divided
into capacity of 199 user cards and 56 admin cards.
Both systems were constructed and programmed according to the design.
All the programming was implemented in Arduino IDE. Programming the
Arduino Uno was easier, because this board is fully supported by the
Arduino IDE.
Programming the Digispark was more complicated, because it has following
disadvantages. It doesn’t support the console of the Arduino IDE, so in case
it doesn’t work properly, the programmer might don’t know what the system
does or what went wrong. The Digispark must be always unplugged and
then plugged in to the PC when a program is being uploaded on it. Another
complication is that two Digispark’s I/O pins are connected to USB, so these
pins must be disconnected to be able to upload a program on it.
These complications are make it harder to program, but on the other side, it
works properly and reliably like the Arduino Uno.
Eventually both systems were programmed well and it works properly.
Functionality of both systems has been verified for all possible cases what
these systems can do, including adding or removing admin and user cards.
Reliability of these designed systems depends on the used hardware,
firmware, complexity of the design and the RFID technology.
The firmware of these systems is programmed as simply as possible to make
it reliable.
The system with the NXP MFRC522 reader sometimes fails during the
encrypted communication. The communication is based on the Arduino
libraries MFRC522 for the communication between the card and the reader
and SPI for the communication between the reader and the Arduino Uno, so
this problem is probably related to them or to one of them. This failure is
the most common in case, when a card is attached to the reader not close
enough. So for the most reliable communication the center of the card must
be attached to the center of the reader antenna coil as close as possible.
The HID reader doesn’t have such problem because its communication is
much more simple.
There is not done power supply for both systems. For both cases in the
system design is written that the development board is powered via USB and
the solenoid needs external power supply 12 V, 1 A. It’s also possible to
power Arduino Uno and Digispark by the 12 V, 1 A power supply via "Vin"
pin. Selection of the way power supply depends on conditions and options in
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exact situation where the system is mounted for its application.
The maximum load of the relay is AC 250V/10A or DC 30V/10A. So the
solenoid can be replaced with any electromagnetic door lock, but there is
also need to change the power supply for the exact chosen door lock instead
of the 12 V, 1 A for the solenoid.
If user of the designed systems wants to replace the solenoid with
electromagnetic door lock and use the same power supply 12 V, 1 A, he
could choose this one [47] made by SDC (Security Door Controls) or many
more made by this manufacturer and also there is many compatible
electromagnetic door locks at the market from many manufacturers, because
very popular power supply for these locks is 12 V and 24 V with current less
than 1 A.
The chapter 8 discuss possibilities of hacking the designed systems and also
there is demonstrated hack of the Mifare Classic card used in the first design
of the access control system and additionally this hack was successfully tested
on ISIC card.
So it’s possible to clone both types of cards HID Prox Card II and Mifare
Classic. But scanning the Mifare card takes such longer (it can be even e
few minutes) because of cracking the cryptography meanwhile scanning the
Prox Card takes no longer than a second. However, NXP semiconductors
(Manufacturer of the Mifare Classic) supplies information that this card is
not recommended for "security relevant applications" [48].
The HID Global (manufacturer of the Prox Card II) supplies no information
about the card’s security on its official page [49], but there is written that it’s
"access control card". In the card datasheet [8] is written under title security,
that the card has available over 137 billion unique codes. This doesn’t rally
mean anything about the security. The hacker can easily scan the code of
the card and make a clone.
However, for some applications it’s possible to use RFID cards that we know
that it’s possible to clone it. For the Mifare Classic is dangerous when some
secret data are stored in the card’s memory such as storing credit on the card,
which is used as electronic wallet. In this case a hacker would be able to
change the value of the credit. To prevent cloning and possibility of reading
and manipulating with the data on the card by hacker, there is needed card
with no broken cryptography, such as the Mifare Desfire EV1.
Both used technologies use cloneable cards whereas clonning the Mifare
Classic card takes longer. To clone both types of cards we need a special
card. For clonning Mifare Classic is needed a card with a changeable UID.
For clonning the Prox Card II is needed a writable type of this card and a
special reader which can read and write to Prox Card II while Mifare Classic
can be cracked with a common reader which supports the ISO/IEC 14443
Type A, but there are needed specified tools like the mfoc installed on the
hacking unit connected to the reader.
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In chapters of the system design are listed prices of actually used RFID
technologies. The HID technology is more expensive although it’s less secure.
The Mifare Classic offers more features, such as over 700 bytes of usable
memory protected by encryption while the Prox Card II stores only one
pre-programmed 26-bit code and no security, so everybody has access to read
this code. Communicating ranges of both readers are nearly the same.
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Appendix A
Photo documentation of the created
access control systems
This appendix includes photos of the created access control systems as
described in chapter 6 and chapter 7.
Figure A.1: Photo of the final working device - Access control system
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.................. A. Photo documentation of the created access control systems
Figure A.2: Photo of the final working device - Access control system, smaller
and reduced solution
66
Appendix B
Video documentation of the created
access control systems
This thesis includes CD with videos of demonstration of using both devices
designed in this work. For each device is made one short video. These systems
are in factory format, so they have clean memory and no authorized cards,
so adding cards follows. In both videos, cards are divided into three clusters:
admin cards, user cards and unauthorized cards. Then there is shown some
removing and adding user and admin cards to the system. For the system
with Mifare cards is also shown erasing whole memory and adding cards to
the system again.
Further there is shown that it works properly after the system is turned
off and on. The solenoid is powered by an external power supply and it is
switched by the relay. When the solenoid is powered on, it reveals the door,
otherwise it blocks the door. In the video it reveals the door when the system
is powered off, because the relay is not powered, while the external power
supply of the solenoid remains on. If there is a power failure, these systems
would not stop blocking the door.
The system with Mifare cars once do not recognize an authorized card, however
when the card is presented again, it works. This error in communication is
discussed in chapter Conclusions.
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